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The Future of Public Health Law
Lawrence 0. Gostin*

ABSTRACT
Developments in medicine and constitutional law dictate modification of
public health legislation in the United States. Traditionally overlooked
by legislators, present public health laws provide inadequate decisionmaking criteria and inappropriate procedures for dealing with issues.
Revised legislation should provide health care officials and agencies with
the tools to balance individual rights against public health necessities.
This Article makes four recommendations for legislative reform: (1)
remove artificial legislative distinction between venereal and other communicable diseases; (2) provide criteria defining "public health necessity" to limit discretionary exercise of police power by health officials; (3)
provide strong confidentiality protections in the collection and storage of
public health information; (4) empower public health officials to select
from a graded series of less restrictive alternatives in dealing with public
health problems.
INTRODUCTION
The protection and preservation of the public health is among the
most important goals of government.1 The classic problem for public
health jurisprudence is to determine the extent to which the state may
restrain its citizens in order to interrupt the spread of communicable
disease. 2 The tension between protection of the public health and protec-

* Lawrence 0. Gostin is Executive Director, American Society of Law & Medicine,
Lecturer in Health Law at Harvard School of Public Health and Legislative Counsel to the
U.S. Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee chaired by Senator Edward Kennedy.
This Article is an expansion of the author's earlier work, Gostin, The Future of Communicable
DiseaseControl, 64 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 79 (1986). Ideas on a new statutory framework
for confidentiality and antidiscrimination are incorporated in Senator Kennedy's AIDS Federal Policy Bill of 1987.
'See, e.g.,Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
2 All of the states have exercised their police power through the enactment of statutes and
regulations restricting individual liberty, in order to impede the spread of infectious diseases.
W. Curran, L. Gostin & M. Clark, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: Legal and Regulatory Policy (1986) (Harvard School of Public Health, contract number 282-86-0032).
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tion of civil liberties is manifest in each of the traditional modes of government intervention. Public health statutes grant the government several
powers: (1) to identify cases of infection through compulsory serologic
testing, screening of populations or physical examination; 3 (2) to identify
additional cases by investigating sexual or other contacts of known cases or
carriers; 4 (3) to require a class of persons to submit to a preventive vaccine
or curative treatment; 5 (4) to control personal behavior by isolating cases or
carriers of disease or by quarantining exposed individuals;' and (5) to
control environmental health risks by closing or regulating specified estab7
lishments.
In each category of state public health power, there is a cost to the
individual. For instance, individuals may be denied the right to decide
whether to submit to a medical examination or treatment. The state's
collection of sensitive health care information about a person or his or her
sexual associates may compromise privacy. Compulsory hospitalization or
segregation from one's community may be necessary if the disease is contagious. Finally, in order to maintain the public health, the state may define
which places a person may frequent, thereby restricting his or her freedom
of association.
The exercise of compulsory public health powers thus poses a classic
conflict between the state's power to act for the community's common good
and the individual's right to liberty, autonomy and privacy. 8 Public health
law requires a most sensitive balancing of collective and individual rights
and interests. A formula for accomplishing this balance, however, is conspicuously absent from public health jurisprudence.

'E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3191 (West 1979) (provides for compulsory
examination of individuals infected with venereal disease).
4
E.g., 10 N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 2.6 (1985) (requires health officers to discover contacts and
unreported cases upon receiving a report of a case of a communicable disease).
'E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-17-3 (1985) (provides for isolation or arrest of persons afflicted
with a venereal disease).
'E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:4-2 (West 1987) (authorizes the department and local boards
of health to maintain and enforce proper and sufficient quarantine whenever deemed necessary).
7
E.g., N.Y. CITY HEALTH CODE § 3.01 (1987) (authorizes the commissioner of health to
take necessary actions to assure maintenance of public health, the prevention of disease, or the
safety of city residents); see also City of N.Y. v. New St. Mark's Baths, 130 Misc. 2d 911, 497
N.Y.S.2d 979 (1986).
ISee, e.g., Moore v. Armstrong, 149 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1963) (enforcement of quarantine to
protect the public health); Dalli v. Board of Educ., 358 Mass. 753, 267 N.E.2d 219 (1971)
(vaccination order enforced); Irwin v. Arrendale, 117 Ga. App. 1, 159 S.E.2d 719 (1967)
(mandatory X-ray of prisoner not assault and battery, where infection is suspected or X-ray is
routine); cf Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942) (sterilization
statute held unconstitutional; court acknowledged that case "touche[d] a sensitive and important area of human rights").
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Although the last two decades have witnessed cogent legal analysis of
other civil justifications for interference with liberty and self-determination, (consider commitment of the mentally ill), restraint for the good of
the health of the people has barely caught the attention of the legal
profession. Much of this complacency disappeared, however, with the
emergence in 1981 of the lethal, geometrically spreading diseaseAcquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS).9
With the AIDS experience in mind, this Article looks to the future of
public health legislation. First, I demonstrate that public health statutes do
not reflect modern conceptions of science and law. Second, I discuss the
absence of adequate criteria and procedures in current public health legislation. Finally, I propose a number of principles for the development of
new statutes and regulations in public health. This Article represents a
critical attempt to develop guidelines for a model public health statute for
state and local legislatures.
I. AN ANTIQUATED CONCEPTION OF COMMUNICABLE
DISEASE CONTROL MEASURES
Appropriately for a commemorative issue, this Article grew out of a
national legislative survey for the United States Assistant Secretary for
Health conducted by Professor William Curran, Professor Mary Clark and
myself at the Harvard School of Public Health. ° The study contained a
thorough analysis of public health statutes passed by Congress, nine state
legislatures, and four city governments-New York, Los Angeles, San
Francisco, and Houston. We also undertook a full analysis of federal and
state court cases in the area of communicable diseases. Finally, the study
reported the results of a survey of AIDS-specific legislation and proposed
legislation, for which responses were elicited from all fifty states and the
District of Columbia. We are currently following this study with a global
survey of health legislation on AIDS for the World Health Organization.
Our work for the United States Assistant Secretary for Health revealed that
public health statutes and case law reflect an approach to communicable
disease control fashionable in the earlier part of this century, but no longer
appropriate for current concerns.
Most statutes and early court decisions presume the pre-eminence of'
public health interests over individual rights, utilizing neither cogent scientific examination of a measure's potential benefit nor legal assessment of
unnecessary restriction on individual rights. The antiquated nature of
For a thorough review of law and policy related to AIDS, see generally the special
symposium issue in 15 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE, edited by William J. Curran and Lawrence
Gostin.
10W. Curran, L. Gostin & M. Clark, supra note 2.
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public health law is reflected in its failure both to keep up with scientific
progress in infectious disease control and to incorporate modern developments in constitutional analysis.
A.

ADVANCES IN THE SCIENCE OF PUBLIC HEALTH

At the time most public health statutes were written and most public
health cases decided, the sciences of virology and epidemiology were in
their infancy. A crude public health tradition of isolation or quarantine of
real or suspected cases of disease was the rule, sometimes involving quarantine of an entire geographic area, without any understanding of the mechanism by which disease spread or how to interrupt it."
Modern public health interventions are founded upon a more sophisticated understanding of disease processes. Science has a more precise
understanding of the etiological agents of infectious disease, the most likely
harborers of the agent, the most efficient modes of its transmission, and the
methods of modifying behaviors or environments in order to interrupt its
spread. Accordingly, modern measures for reducing the spread of disease
are predominantly based upon research, education, and counselling, specifically targeted to groups at risk of spreading or contracting the disease.
Public health statutes and judicial review of' public health action should
reflect these new scientific understandings by requiring that the goals of
public health measures be limited to the interruption of the most efficient
modes of disease transmission. The public health benefit is thus
maximized, and restrictions on individual liberty limited to those clearly
necessary for the community health.
When instituting or reviewing public health measures, legislatures and
courts must consider certain scientific realities including method of transmission, period of incubation, and degree of health risk. An effective
public health policy must focus specifically upon the mechanism of transmission of the infectious agent. The objective is to control the settings or
behaviors most efficient in communicating the agent. For example, restriction of associational freedoms may be a valid policy to prevent the spread of
an airborne disease, but is not justified for a blood-borne disease such as
AIDS. Different methods of transmission suggest different public health
responses. Cholera, for example, is spread through food and water, justifying stringent control of specific individual behavior; general associational
controls are irrelevant. The quarantine invoked to combat yellow fever
proved to be an inappropriate and ineffective response;1 2 the agent is
transmitted by mosquitoes, not through the air.
"See, e.g., Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900) (court found that
quarantine area was too large and was unrelated to effective disease control).
"2G. ROSEN, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 326 (1958); see also W. MCNEIL, PLAGUES AND
PEOPLES

236-37 (1976).
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The period of communicability limits the time during which a control
measure is useful. If the period of communicability is quite short, compulsory measures may be justified, but only while the person poses a health
risk. When there is no finite period of communicability, however, in the
case of AIDS, it is difficult to justify the potentially significant infringement
of individual rights necessitated by compulsory control measures.
The availability of a prevention 3 or treatment 14 for an infectious
condition can serve as a weighty justification for the introduction of certain
public health measures, including compulsory examination, vaccination,
treatment and contact tracing. The use of a simple, safe and efficacious
treatment means that the compulsory measure will be of short duration
and can be legally justified on grounds of unquestioned benefit to the
individual and expected protection of the public. The classic modern
example is the use of penicillin to cure the syphilis infection. The availability of a relatively nonintrusive and certain cure helps to justify compulsory
case-finding, medical examination, and treatment. No such justification
currently exists in the case of AIDS, as medical science has yet to discover
an effective curative treatment or vaccine for the disease. Legal intervention is unwarranted where no scientific intervention is capable of breaking
the cycle of infection.
Finally, the seriousness and prevalence of a disease influences the decision
whether or not to adopt a restrictive public health response. A disease that
is highly communicable, but usually not fatal, does not warrant significant
restrictions on liberty. AIDS, however, is a lethal disease, spreading rapidly
in the population. Both of these factors justify control measures, even at
some expense to individual liberty. Nonetheless, measures introduced to
control AIDS must be clearly effective in interrupting the spread of the
disease, and must not be wholly disproportionate to the expected societal
benefits.
B.

DEVELOPMENTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Since the late 18th and early 19th centuries, when much public health
law was formulated, 15 the constitutional balance of public health regulation
has shifted dramatically. The early courts were highly deferential to state
public health regulation under the police powers. 16 Some courts suggested
13E.g., immunization for polio.
14 E.g., penicillin for gonorrhea.
"5See generally Merritt, Communicable Disease and Constitutional Law: ControllingAIDS, 61
N.Y.U. L. REv. 739 (1986); Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine:The Revival of an ArchaicDoctrine, 14
HOFSTRA L. REv. 53 (1985).

16See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25-29 (1905) (court held compulsory
smallpox vaccination to be a constitutional exercise of the police power; restraint on liberty
was essential to secure public health); City of Little Rock v. Smith, 163 S.W.2d 705, 707-08
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that police power regulation was immune from constitutional review, expressing the notion that, "where the police power is set in motion in its
propelr sphere, the courts have no jurisdiction to stay the arm of the
legislative branch."1 7 In their haste to give effect to any state action designed to promote health and welfare, these courts abdicated their traditional role as guarantor of constitutional rights.
The view that courts lacked the power to intervene in the exercise of
public health powers was clearly wrong, even in the context of the early
8
twentieth century. The U.S. Supreme Court, inJacobson v. Massachusetts,1
explained the proper role of the courts in reviewing public health legislation which prevailed for most of this century. The Court inJacobson mandated that public health regulation be clearly designed to achieve a legitimate public health goal. Even though the goal of the legislature may be
valid and beneficent, the methods adopted must have a "real or substantial
relation" to protection of the public health, and cannot be "a plain, palpable
invasion of rights."' 9 The state "must refrain from acting in an arbitrary,
unreasonable manner, 20 or "going so far beyond what [is] reasonably
21
required for the safety of the public.
The "arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable" standard was highly
deferential. The Court would support any reasonable state regulatory
measure which was not wholly irrational, indiscriminate or enacted in bad
faith. The following cases established the parameters of this standard.
1. True Purpose
The preservation of the public health is a proper concern of state
legislatures. Courts have looked beyond the nominal statutory intent to
discover the true legislative purpose, however, and have not been bound by
"mere forms," nor misled by "mere pretenses" tinder the guise of police
powers. 22 They have required that the legislature's motivation be directed
towards health and welfare, thereby disallowing a disguised form of discrimination. If prejudice were shown to have guided the exercise of police
powers for the ostensible purpose of controlling AIDS or another infectious disease, the courts would not uphold the statute. Nor could the-state,
(Ark. 1942) ("private rights ... must yield in the interest of the public security," venereal
disease "affects the public health so intimately and so insidiously, that considerations of
delicacy and privacy may not be permitted to thwart measures necessary to avert the public
peril.").
11Arizona v. Southern Pacific Co., 61 Ariz. 66, 145 P.2d 530 (1943) (quoting State ex rel.
McBride v. Superior Court, 103 Wash. 409, 174 P. 973, 976 (1918)).
18 197 U.S. 11 (1905); see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
' 9Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31.
"I1d. at 28.
21Id.
"2See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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purporting to protect the public, arbitrarily interfere with private business,
or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful activities;
whether they have done so in a particular case is ajudicial question.2 3 If any
doubt existed as to the actual purpose of the exercise of compulsory public
health powers, the courts would be expected to delve deeply into the
legislative history and full statutory scheme to discover the true legislative
intent.
2. The Subject of Compulsory Powers Must Actually be Infectious
A substantial line of cases 24 requires medical proof that the subject of
compulsory public health powers was actually infectious when the control
measures were imposed. 25 "The mere possibility that persons may have
been exposed to such disease [smallpox] is not sufficient ....They must
have been exposed to it, and the conditions actually exist for a communication of the contagion. '2 6 Furthermore, these issues are to be determined by
"medical science and skill, and not common knowledge. '27
3. The Control Measure Itself Should Not Pose a Health Risk to Its Subject
Those who harbor a communicable virus can be required to submit to
compulsory measures for the common good. The control measure itself,
28
however, may not pose a health risk to its subject. InJew Ho v. Williamson
the court was heavily influenced by evidence that confining large groups of
people in an area where bubonic plague was suspected placed those under
quarantine at increased risk of contracting the disease. 2 9
2

1See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894); Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 102 (C.C.N.D.
Cal. 1900).
24 The early courts were not entirely consistent in requiring medical proof that the subject
of compulsory public health powers was actually infectious. See, e.g., State v. Rackowski, 86
Conn. 677, 681, 86 A. 606, 608 (1913) ("common knowledge tells us that contagious diseases
may be communicated by those who have been exposed."). See generally Kirk v. Wyman, 83
S.C. 372, 65 S.E. 387 (1909).
25 Railroad Company v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471-73 (1887) (state prohibition of transporting foreign cattle, whether diseased or not, placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce); Ex parte Martin, 83 Cal. App. 2d 164, 188 P.2d 287 (1948) (public health officials
must have "probable cause" to quarantine pending an opportunity for further investigation or
examination); Exparte Shepard, 51 Cal. App. 49, 195 P. 1077 (1921) (court specifically rejected
proposition that mere suspicion is sufficient to uphold a quarantine order); Exparte Arata, 52
Cal. App. 380, 198 P. 814 (1921) (court required that reasonable ground must exist to support
the claim that the person is afflicted with venereal disease); Ex parte Dillon, 44 Cal. App. 239,
186 P. 170 (1919) (marital status cannot constitute "reasonable cause" for suspicion of venereal
disease); People v. Tait, 261 I1. 197, 103 N.E. 750 (1913) (family member not residing in
household affected by scarlet fever should not be quarantined).
26 Smith v. Emery, 11 A.D. 10, 42 N.Y.S. 258 (1896).

2

1Id.

29

at 260.

F. 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900).
1d. at 22.

28103
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The court in Kirk v. Wyman 30 was quite prepared to uphold a quarantine despite the absence of proof that the form of leprosy from which Mary
Kirk was suffering was contagious. Nevertheless, the court would not
subject her to an unsafe environment. She was to have been quarantined in
a pesthouse-a "structure of four small rooms in a row, with no piazzas,
used heretofore for the isolation of negroes with smallpox, situated within
a hundred yards of the place where the trash of the city ...is collected and
burned."13'The court concluded that "even temporary isolation in such a
place would be a serious affliction and peril to an elderly lady, enfeebled by
disease, and accustomed to the comforts of life."32 The public health department was compelled to wait until it had finished building Miss Kirk a
33
"comfortable cottage" outside the city limits.
Public health departments have an obligation to avoid unnecessary
harm by providing safe environments for quarantine subjects. Indeed, the
quid pro quo for loss of liberty should be an obligation to provide the finest
possible care and conditions to those who must forego their individual
rights for the collective good. Subjects of isolation or quarantine have
committed no criminal offense, and should be afforded a habitable and
healthful place to reside.
C.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES

The three standards mentioned above still survive, and should apply in
a contemporary judicial analysis, but a more rigorous examination under
modern equal protection and due process standards is necessary.
Inherent in the reasoning of modern courts are the different levels of
scrutiny undertaken for the various constitutionally protected interests and
classes burdened by a particular control measure. Despite the traditional
deferential posture of the courts, compulsory measures directed toward
persons with infectious diseases are increasingly subject to judicial scrutiny.
Almost all of the relevant cases were decided prior to the remarkable

3083 S.C. 372, 65 S.E. 387 (1909).
"'Id.
at 382-83, 65 S.E. at 391.
32
/d..
" Id. The court was less rigorous, however, in reviewing the conditions of quarantine in
Ex parte Martin, 83 Cal. App. 2d 164, 188 P.2d 287 (1948). The court supported giving the
health officers discretion as to the place of quarantine. The county jail was designated as a
quarantine area for people with venereal disease despite uncontested evidence that it was
overcrowded and had been condemned by a legislative investigating committee. The court
supported the Attorney General's position that "[W]hile jails, as public institutions, were
established for purposes other than confinement of diseased persons, occasions of emergency
or lack of other public facilities for quarantine require that jails be used." Id. at 170, 188 P.2d
at 291.
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evolution in constitutional decision-making which has occurred since the
3
civil rights movement. 1
The Supreme Court, developing a higher level of constitutional review
where state action interferes with fundamental liberties, has delineated
several constitutionally protected rights, including travel,3 5 marriage,3 6 and
37
certain privacy interests associated with family life and childbearing.
Traditionally, a judicial finding that a state measure impinges upon a
fundamental right signals that the statute will be found unconstitutional. In
the public health sphere, however, the court could conceivably uphold a
statute which impinges upon fundamental rights, if that statute is clearly
necessary for the health of the community.
Courts will strictly construe public health measures that burden constitutionally protected liberty, marital or privacy interests. 38 Such measures
must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Moreover,
the measure must be the least restrictive alternative for achievement of the
public health objective. 9
A number of traditional public health measures that impinge upon
fundamental liberties could potentially trigger this higher level of judicial
scrutiny. Any form of isolation, quarantine, or civil commitment directly
impacts the right to liberty. Certain programs for premarital screening
could potentially restrict the right to marry. A recently enacted Utah
statute, 40 for example, proscribes marriage for any person with AIDS. As
the AIDS infection has no cure, this statutory prohibition is permanent and
irreversible. Given that the provision could achieve no compelling public
health purpose, and that it would be a direct infringement of a fundamental right, the statute will in all likelihood be found unconstitutional. Total
prohibition of marriage can be differentiated from other public health
measures such as premarital screening for syphilis. In the latter situation, a
person who tests positive can be effectively treated with penicillin and the
marriage license can then be issued.

34

See Note, The Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1274 (1986);
Gostin, The Futureof Communicable Disease Control, 64 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 79 (1986).
35
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969).
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1966); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-84
(1978).
3
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
38See,
e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-27 (1979) (evaluating the standard of
proof required for civil commitment of the mentally ill); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 218 (1944) (finding that nothing short of apprehension by proper authorities of the
gravest imminent danger to public safety can justify a curfew or forced removal from one's
home).
35
See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) (compelling state
interest is necessary to justify restrictions on citizens' right to vote); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 337 (1971).
40 UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (Supp. 1987).
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The most challenging issue is the extent to which the constitutional
right to privacy is applicable to traditional public health policies for
casefinding (e.g. testing or contact tracing) and regulation of public
facilities such as bathhouses or food establishments. A right to privacy is not
enumerated in the Constitution, but the Supreme Court has recognized
such a right where there is an expectation of intimacy in relation to
contraception,4 1 abortion, 42 and childrearing. 43 Any direct state health regulation in these areas could result in application of the highest level of
judicial scrutiny. This might occur, for example, if the state required the
termination of any pregnancy in which the mother is found to harbor the
AIDS virus.
State regulation of sexual intimacy to control sexually transmitted
diseases should be subject to right of privacy limitations, without differentiation for gays, prostitutes, or drug abusers. Any careful reading of the
current jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, however, would conclude
that the right to privacy is not elastic and will be rigidly applied only to
those areas where there is direct precedent, such as abortion or contraception.
The most instructive decision on the future of the right to privacy is
Bowers v. Hardwick,44 which significantly delimits the privacy rights that the
Court is prepared to protect under its higher level of scrutiny. The Court
found that the constitutional right to privacy would not "extend to a
fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual
sodomy." 45 The state interest in interfering with consensual sexual relations
among adults is almost entirely a matter of public morality. If the Court is
prepared to uphold state action on this basis, it will undoubtedly uphold
legitimate public health measures which interfere with intimate sexual
activities, such as contact tracing or the closing of bathhouses. 46
The two-tiered constitutional analysis developed by the courts is subject to criticism because it is highly mechanistic. If specific "fundamental"
rights are affected, a court will analyze the statute critically; if no "fundamental" rights are affected, the constitutional restraints on state action are
negligible. This form of constitutional analysis is not useful in the area of
public health, which requires a sensitive balancing of the efficacy of a public
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1976).

41

42 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
43

See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.

390 (1923).
44106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). See generally Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal
Predilection, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 648 (1987).
45Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
46 The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether infringements on the right to heterosexual privacy, such as fornication statutes, are constitutional. It is arguable, however, that the

Court would more closely scrutinize public health measures which restrict heterosexual
activities than it would those proscribing homosexual relations.
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health measure with the infringement upon individual rights. Consider,
for example, a statute banning certain meeting places where sexual activity
takes place, such as bathhouses, brothels, or even hotel rooms used by
unmarried couples. Such a statute would interfere with sexual intimacy,
but the circumstances probably do not come within the Supreme Court's
narrow view of constitutionally protected privacy interests.
Recent decisions, notably City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living
Center,47 have begun to erode the Supreme Court's artificial tiers of
scrutiny. The Cleburne Court struck down a zoning ordinance excluding
group homes for mentally handicapped people. Although the Court found
no reason to raise its standard of review, it nevertheless searched deep into
the record to conclude that no rational basis existed for believing that
mentally handicapped people would pose a special threat to the city's
4
legitimate interests.
The critical teaching of Cleburne is that public policy makers can be
virtually assured of judicial and political support for compulsory public
health measures to control the spread of infectious disease, provided they
are based upon the current state of scientific understanding. Such measures would not be required "to resort to close distinctions or to maintain a
precise, scientific uniformity," 49 no matter how desirable this may be. What
policy makers may not do-even under the judiciary's "minimum rationality" review-is base their measures on "vague, undifferentiated fears
•.. of some portion of the community" or on "irrational prejudice." 50 Nor
may public health regulators succumb to "a bare ...desire to harm a
politically unpopular group."'" Thus a measure adversely affecting any
individual must not only be justified by a good faith intention to promote
the health of the community and shown not to discriminate against particular groups such as gays, prostitutes, or IV-drug abusers; it must also be
supported by evidence of the potential efficacy of the measure.
II. CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH
STATUTES
Most public health statutes and court decisions have expressed little
regard for the burden imposed upon individual rights by the exercise of
compulsory powers; therefore, no clearly stated criteria or procedures exist
to guide public health officials in the exercise of their powers. Society,

"City

4

1Id.

49

of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).

at 447-50.

1d. at 459 (opinion of Marshall, J., concurring in part) (quoting Allied Stores of Ohio,
Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959)).
50
Id. at 445, 450.
51Id. at 447 (quoting United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535 (1973)).
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through the legislature, has not yet established the proper criteria for
making important public health decisions. The delicate balance between
public protection and individual rights is thus left to the unfettered, largely
unreviewable discretion of public health officials. Moreover. public health
statutes often fail to provide the rigorous and impartial decision-making
standards required by fourteenth amendment due process considerations.
Considering that public health law is one of the very few areas in which
individual liberty can be restricted without the commission of a criminal
offense, the criteria and procedures for decision-making must be clearly
understood and fairly applied.
A.

CRITERIA FOR ACCOUNTABLE AND CONSISTENT DECISION-MAKING

Clearly stated criteria for the regulation of public health and civil
liberties are essential. Society, through its legislature and judiciary, must
determine the circumstances under which exercise of compulsory public
health powers isjustified. Both legislatures and courts have, however, been
silent with respect to the legitimate boundaries of public health power. The
absence of clear legislative criteria and judicial oversight has resulted in
unjustifiably restrictive measures due to health officials' response to the
pressure of public fear. Even worse, public health measures have sometimes been mere pretenses for restricting the rights of politically insular or
5
unpopular minority groups.
Current public health statutes provide only the most general criteria
under which compulsory powers can be exercised, leaving the public health
officer with wide discretion. The California Health and Safety Code, for
example, allows the state to imprison or confine an individual "for the
protection of the public peace or health .... -5' The New York Public
Health Law similarly empowers the health officer to isolate persons when
necessary for the protection of the public health.5 4
If challenged in court today, the criteria in many current public health
statutes for depriving an individual of liberty would likely be held unconstitutionally vague.5 5 Civil commitment of the mentally ill or drug dependent is the only other legal context in which liberty may be deprived
without proof of the commission of a criminal offense; confinement for
both public health and mental health reasons is based upon the principle
52

See, e.g., Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900), discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 89-91.
" CAL. GOV'T CODE § 202 (West 1980) (authority to confine for protection of public peace
or health).
54N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2100 (McKinney 1985) (communicable disease provisions and
powers, duties of local boards of health and health officers).
5
E.g., Hancock v. Cox, 212 Va. 215, 183 S.E.2d 149 (1971) (statute requiring civil
commitment of alcoholics struck down as unconstitutionally vague).
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that restriction of individual rights is justified by the avoidance of future
harm to the community. Mental health statutes prior to the 1970's had
language similar to that still used in public health statutes. They authorized
civil commitment if the patient was mentally ill and "in need of treatment
or care" or ifcommitment was necessary to protect the welfare of the
individual or the welfare of others. 56 Many statutes were struck down as
unconstitutionally vague and insufficiently related to the state's valid inter57
ests in protecting the public from harm.
Broad discretionary language has remained in public health statutes
only because it has not been challenged in the courts since the developments in constitutional law described above. The incorporation of clear
statutory criteria into public health statutes could help prevent inappropriate use of public health powers. Objective criteria are important because
they place boundaries upon the discretion of public health officials, and put
individuals on notice as to the circumstances which may give rise to loss of
liberty. Ultimately, such standards allow society, through its legislative
process, to achieve the delicate balance between individual autonomy and
the public health. Clear statutory criteria would produce more consistent
decision-making and avoid measures based upon unsubstantiated fears or
prejudice.
B.

PROCEDURES FOR FAIR AND IMPARTIAL DECISION-MAKING

In addition to specifying standards for restraining individuals, a
scheme for the control of communicable disease must identify the
decision-makers and describe a process for gathering information and
making fair and correct decisions. Most state statutes delegate wide discretion to public health officials and have not carefully considered procedural
safeguards designed to achieve both a more accurate fact-finding process
and greater equity and fairness to the individual whose liberty is to be
restrained.
Many public health statutes are either silent or wholly inconsistent in
their provision of procedural due process protections to subjects of compulsory powers. Commonly, compulsory powers are delegated to administrative public health officers without any explicit procedural requirements.
California law, for example, authorizes the California Department of
Health Services to identify and then quarantine or isolate individuals with a

87 HARV. L.
56See generally Developments in the Law, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
REv. 1190 (1974).
E.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (statute permitting civil
commitment without adequate notice or opportunity for hearing violates due process);
Johnson v. Soloman, 484 F. Supp. 278 (D. Md. 1979)(civil commitment based on assessment of
juvenile's "best interests" is unconstitutionally vague).
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communicable disease whenever, in itsjudgment, such action is necessary to
protect or preserve the public health. 58 Similar language is found in many
59
public health statutes across the country.
A few statutes do mandate application to a judge or magistrate for an
order of isolation or quarantine, but specify no other procedural requirements. 6° Even statutes recognizing the importance of an impartial factfinder for an order of isolation or quarantine fail to provide procedural
safeguards prior to the exercise of other compulsory powers, such as
mandatory physical examination, treatment, or contact tracing. For example, several statutes originating in the 1940's identify specific categories of
individuals who may be required to undergo venereal disease examination
by a public health officer. 6t The applicable New Jersey statute, for example,
creates a presumption that a prostitute "or other lewd person" may reasonably be suspected of having a venereal disease and may therefore be
62
subjected to examination at any time without a hearing.
These statutory provisions survive only because they have yet to be
challenged in the courts. Mental health statutes before the 1970's which
failed to require rigorous due process procedures were found violative of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.43 The mental health
cases have required notice and a hearing before a judge, and established a
right to counsel. 64 The standard of proof constitutionally required at civil
commitment hearings is more than a preponderance of evidence; typically,
6' 5
commitment demands "clear and convincing evidence.
Courts in the current process-oriented era of constitutional review
would most likely require procedural safeguards prior to or-in an
emergency-immediately after the exercise of personal control measures
to protect the public health. In determining the kinds of procedures re-

& SAFETY CODE § 3050 (West 1979).
E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.28(l) (West Stipp. 1987); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 26:4-2 (West
1987). But see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-5 (West 1986) (duties of Public Health Commissioner
more detailed).
6
°See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2301 (McKinney 1985). For example, the court in
State v. Snow, 230 Ark. 746, 324 S.W.2d 532 (1959) was able to thwart a state effort to
quarantine an individual for tuberculosis only because initial judicial approval was required by
the authorizing statute before enforcement could take place.
6
E.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:4-32 (applicable to prostitutes), § 26:4-49.6 (West 1987)
(applicable to migrant workers).
" CAL. HEALTH

5

6 NJ. STAT. ANN.
63

§ 26:4-32 (West 1987).

See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972); In re Seefield, 2
MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 363 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1977) (sequel to Lessard; the Wisconsin statute
enacted in response to Lessard was held unconstitutional); Colyar v. ThirdJudicial Dist. Court,
469 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1979); Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980).
" Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (inmate has liberty interest in preventing transfer
from prison to mental institution).
65Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (19 79)("clear and convincing proof" is required for
indefinite involuntary commitment).
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quired under the fourteenth amendment, the courts balance the interests
of the state with those of the individual.6 6 The state's interest in protecting
the public from serious harm is compelling. The interest of the individual
grows with the level of coerciveness of the public health measure to be
applied. When a control measure, such as isolation, infringes upon liberty,
the courts will likely require strict procedural due process safeguards in
light of the deep invasion of personal rights, the risk of erroneous factfinding, and the importance of avoiding confinement of nondangerous
persons.
The West Virginia Supreme Court reasoned in Greene v. Edwards6 that
there is little difference between loss of liberty under mental health and
public health rationales. Each case bases the exercise of the police power
upon protection of the public. The individual's loss of freedom is calculated
primarily for the common good. Prospective subjects of quarantine are
therefore entitled to the same procedural safeguards as a person facing
civil commitment: written notice, counsel, presentation of evidence, cross
examination, a "clear and convincing" standard of proof, and a verbatim
transcript for appeal. The state need not, however, go so far as to provide
the procedural safeguards of a criminal trial.6 The foregoing procedural
requirements should be built into public health statutes. Prior to-or in
cases of urgent necessity-immediately after the imposition of personal
control measures, an impartial decision-maker should hear the case. This
function should properly come within the jurisdiction of the courts. The
states should bear the burden of providing a hearing; the individual should
not be left to discover after-the-fact remedies such as habeas corpus. The
potential subject of control measures should have the right to be represented by counsel, to promote critical examination of the grounds and
evidence upon which decisions are to be made.
State legislatures should give careful thought to these procedural
safeguards designed to achieve both a more accurate fact-finding process
and greater equity and fairness to the individual whose liberty is to be
restrained. Procedural due process is not merely protective of the individual; it is also a means of ensuring high quality decision-making where a
structured opportunity for full information is presented to a dispassionate
decision-maker. Such hearings provide an opportunity for public health
officials to review their general strategy for controlling disease epidemics,
together with the application of that strategy in the particular case.
Society has not used its legislature to delimit the circumstances under
which important public health decisions should be made. As public health
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Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
67 263 S.E.2d 661 (W. Va. 1980).
68
1d. at 662.
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is one of the very few reasons for which individual liberty can be restricted
absent the commission of a criminal offense, it is essential that legislatures
guide officials to clearly understand and fairly apply decision-making criteria and procedures.
III. PRINCIPLES FOR THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH
LEGISLATION
As guidelines for state and local legislatures in reforming their public
health statutes, I propose the following bases for public health statutes:
(1) public health statutes should be uniformly structured; the
current artificial boundaries extended between venereal and
communicable diseases should be removed;
(2) the exercise of compulsory powers should be based upon a
demonstrated "public health necessity," which includes a serious
danger to others;
(3) strong confidentiality protections should be in place; and
(4) a graded series of less restrictive powers should be available to
the public health department.
A.

STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN PUBLIC HEALTH STATUTES: DISEASE

CLASSIFICATION

Most public health statutes cannot deal sensitively and flexibly with the
wide range of diseases facing modern public health departments. Many are
severely outdated, having been fashioned on an ad hoc basis, with new
statutory or administrative layers added as new health crises arose. In
essence, the laws have developed by putting out fires, without comprehensive planning for modern public health problems. This "firefighting" approach to public health laws left health officials with few tools to combat the
sudden introduction of a highly lethal blood borne disease such as AIDS, a
disease with a long incubation period and chronic infectiousness. AIDS has
drawn attention to the deficiencies in public health legislation.
Most current statutory schemes erect an artificial boundary between
venereal (sexually transmitted) diseases and other communicable diseases. 69 Each disease must fit within the straitjacket of these two rigid
classifications. The rationale behind classifying diseases is to distinguish
between their modes of transmission. Most state statutes deal with sexually
transmitted diseases, such as syphilis, gonorrhea, and herpes, separately
from all other communicable diseases.
69"E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3194 (West 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 184.01 (West
1986). Sometimes diseases are classified as neither communicable nor venereal, but simply as

"reportable" or "notifiable." This indicates that the disease is not subject to control measures,
but that it must be reported to the public health department. The public health department
collects this data for epidemiologic purposes, to determine the spread pattern of the disease
within the population.
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The classification of a particular disease is of particular significance in
most statutory schemes. Current venereal or sexually transmitted disease
classifications almost universally authorize stricter personal control measures. 70 Individuals with a venereal disease are potentially subject to compulsory reporting requirements, surveillance, sexual contact tracing, physical examination, treatment and isolation. Approximately one-half of the
public health statutes also specifically make the intentional or reckless
71
spread of venereal diseases a criminal offense.
By contrast, diseases classified as communicable generally do not automatically authorize isolation, contact tracing, physical examination, or
treatment. Most statutes require the promulgation of a specific regulation
in order to exercise compulsory public health powers to combat communicable diseases.
Another consequence of classification is a greater degree of confidentiality for individuals with venereal diseases. If a disease is classified as
sexually transmitted, there is usually a specific statutory provision proscribing the release of personal information, sometimes even in response to a
judicial subpoena.7 2 If a disease is classified as communicable, there is
frequently only weak statutory protection of confidentiality. The justification most often offered is that sexually transmitted diseases are believed to
involve social or moral opprobrium and reputational damage.
The artificial boundary between communicable and venereal disease is
attributable to the dead weight of tradition; no substantial justification
exists for its continuance in public health statutes. There are four major
reasons for this conclusion. First, many diseases do not come tidily packaged according to their mode of transmission, but have overlapping mechanisms of communication. Blood-borne diseases, such as hepatitis B or
AIDS, are transmitted through bodily fluids including blood and semen.
There is no logical reason for designating such diseases exclusively as either
communicable or venereal, as they have characteristics of both categories.
When a new infectious disease is spreading rapidly through the population,
it must be classified within the rigid statutory scheme. Placing a disease in a
particular classification often requires a public health (sometimes a quasipolitical) decision involving a time consuming amendment to the regulations. State by state classification decisions for AIDS have resulted in confusion, delay, and illogical conclusions.
Second, the overriding purpose of public health statutes is to determine the circumstances under which public health officials should be au"°E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3191 (West 1979); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, § 690
(1985 & Supp. 1986).
71 See generally Field & Sullivan, AIDS and the Criminal Law, 15 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE
46 (1987).
72
E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
§ 146.025(5) (West Supp. 1987).

CODE §

199.20-21 (West Supp. 1987); WIsc.

STAT. ANN.
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thorized or mandated to exercise their powers. The major concerns of
public health officials are the degree of danger to the community, the
existence of effective public health interventions to impede the spread of
disease, and the liberty and privacy infringement entailed in exercising
public health powers. These considerations cut across the statutory
classifications and are equally applicable to venereal and communicable
diseases. Although the mode of transmission is of critical importance in
formulating infection control strategies, there is no neat package of measures appropriate to one disease grouping as opposed to another. Confidentiality is desirable for all diseases.
The third reason for opposing the traditional classification of diseases
is that venereal disease controls are based upon antiquated and decidedly
discriminatory public health and social perspectives. Reminiscent of an
earlier era, venereal disease classifications connote punishment for
wrong-doers. The concomitant problems inherent in surveillance, intimate
physical examination, and personal controls have little to do with valid
public health concerns such as the degree of risk to the population. These
provisions have persistently been targeted at prostitutes, and, in the early to
middle part of this century, resulted in isolation of thousands of people."3
This use of public health isolation became entwined with social stigma,
social control, and the criminal law. The interconnection of public health
and punitive criminal law was manifested in several ways: states allowed
prostitutes to be held in custody longer than the criminal law would itself
allow,"4 created specific criminal penalties for intended or reckless transmissions of disease, 7 5 allowed the indiscriminate use of public health powers without proof that the "prostitute" was even infectious, 7 6 and permitted
the use of overcrowded prisons for incarceration pursuant to public health
powers.

77

The fourth reason for opposing existing disease classifications is that
they are unnecessarily complicated and confusing. Public health statutes
across the nation are often indigestible amalgams, comprised of several
layers of statutory provisions and administrative rulemaking. They are
often beyond the comprehension of informed members of the public, and
difficult to construe even for experienced public health officials and lawyers. Simply gaining access to a complete package of regulatory measures
and relevant notices is a difficult undertaking. Lack of clarity in law is

3

See A.

BRANDT,

No

MAGIC BULLET: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF VENEREAL DISEASE IN THE

UNITED STATES SINCE 1880 84-92 (1985);
14 Parmet, supra note 15, at 66.

see also Parmet, supra note 15, at 66-67.

Field & Sullivan, supra note 71.
' Exparte Company, 106 Ohio St. 50, 53, 139 N.E. 204, 205 (1922).
77Exparte
Martin, 83 Cal. App. 2d 164, 170, 188 P.2d 287, 291 (1948).
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unsatisfactory, particularly where the decisions to be made affect the
public health and individual rights.
The only arguably valid reason for creating separate disease categories
is that the substantive provisions in the different categories may be better
suited to helping public health officials impede the spread of disease. This
advantage does not accrue, however, from existing disease classifications.
No clear public health rationale exists for providing statutory authority to
control the spread of only venereal diseases, and not certain communicable
diseases. It is odd, for example, to suppose that an airborne disease is not
necessarily isolable without a specific regulatory amendment, while a sexually transmitted disease is always isolable.
The modes of transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV) cut across both statutory classifications; it is not logical, therefore, to
classify AIDS under a single heading. Yet, the fact that AIDS is a rapidly
spreading disease and that sexual contact is by far the major means of
transmission suggest a designation as venereal. The Texas Public Health
Department proposed to categorize HIV as a sexually transmitted disease
in 1985 and 1986, but was forced to withdraw the proposal. (In 1987,
Texas finally changed the classification of HIV infection to communicable).7 8
Public health departments generally have avoided classifying AIDS as
a venereal disease or have simply failed to amend their regulations at all,
because any AIDS activity is subject to intense public scrutiny, and may be
construed as an intention to secure those compulsory powers against vulnerable groups. Yet, there is no clear public health rationale for providing
statutory authority to control the spread of venereal communicable diseases, while providing no statutory authority to control the spread of AIDS.
Nor is there a clear rationale for affording greater confidentiality protection for venereal diseases than for AIDS and diseases like it. The political
entanglement caused by the classification of AIDS is exemplified by Proposition 64 in California, in which voters were asked whether AIDS should be
added to the list of "infectious, contagious, and communicable diseases" for
which reporting, employment restriction, and isolation of individuals were
specifically authorized. The voters overwhelmingly rejected the proposal.
The California experience demonstrates that public health regulation has
become a charged political act, rather than a rational public health determination.
B.

PUBLIC HEALTH NECESSITY

The constitutional foundation for the exercise of compulsory powers is
a public health necessity. 79 This section proposes that "public health neces78

TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4419b-l (Vernon Supp. 1988).
" See, e.g.,Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905); State v. Rackowski, 86 Conn.
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sity" should be made a specific component of modern public health statutes. Although the principle of public health necessity may appear basic, a
brief review of the exercise of public health powers during this century will
demonstrate that repeated and serious abuses of public health powers are
traceable to statutory lack 'of clarity and the failure to require scientific
evidence of necessity.
1. The Historical Use of Public Health Powers in the Absence of Necessity
The absence of a clear statutory or judicial requirement of necessity as
the foundation for public health action has resulted in largely ineffective
and highly invidious infection control strategies. Some of the worst abuses
against vulnerable groups have occurred in the name of public health.
Some early public health cases illustrate the harm that can result from
imposing control measures that are not clearly supported by scientific

evidence. In Kirk v. Wyman, s0 an elderly woman with anaesthetic leprosy
was isolated even though there was "hardly any danger of contagion. 81 She
had lived in the community for many years, attended church services,
taught in school, and mingled in social life without ever communicating the
disease. The court thought it "manifest that the board were well within
their duty in requiring the victim of it to be isolated" when the "distressing
nature of the malady is regarded. 8' 2 The court's preparedness to support
the public health department was not diminished by the fact that Mrs.
Kirk's disease was incurable and that the isolation would be indefinite. In

State v. Rackowski,8 3 the court did not require any more than "common
84
knowledge" in deciding whether or not a person had scarlet fever.
The worst cases of misuse of public health power occur when public
health measures appear to be associated with discrimination against vulnerable groups. In the early to middle part of this century, tens of thousands of prostitutes were "quarantined" as real or suspected carriers of
venereal disease.8 5 In Ex parte Company8 the court upheld a quarantine
regulation which included a provision that "[a]ll known prostitutes and
persons associated with them shall be considered as reasonably suspected of

677, 680, 86 A. 606, 608 (1913); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (the right of a
state to protect the public health can only arise from a vital necessity for its exercise, and
cannot be carried beyond the scope of that necessity); Rock v. Carney, 216 Mich. 280, 297, 185
N.W. 798, 799 (1921); Wilson v. Alabama G.S.R. Co., 77 Miss. 714, 719, 28 So. 567, 569
(1900). But see Kaul v. City of Chehalis, 45 Wash. 2d 616, 623, 27 P.2d 352, 356 (1954).
80 83 S.C. 372, 65 S.E. 387 (1909); see text accompanying notes 22-33 supra.
"'Kirk, 83 S.C. at 377, 65 S.E. at 390.
82

Id.

386 Conn. 677, 86 A. 606 (1913).
S4 d. at 681, 86 A. at 608.
85
A. BRANDT, supra note 73.
88 106

Ohio St. 50, 139 N.E. 204.
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having a venereal disease." ' The court did not appear unduly concerned
with whether or not Martha Company actually had venereal disease. Even
as late as 1944, a court accepted the logic that "suspected" prostitutes were
"natural subjects and carriers of venereal disease," making it "logical and
88
natural that suspicion be cast upon them.1
One of the most invidious public health measures was struck down in
Jew Ho v. Williamson. 9 Public health officials had quarantined an entire
district of San Francisco containing a population of more than 15,000
persons, ostensibly to contain an epidemic of bubonic plague, which is most
easily communicated in conditions of overcrowding and unsanitary conditions. The court said that the public health measure actually posed a
danger to the health of the community: "[i]t must necessarily follow that, if
a large territory is quarantined, intercommunications of the people within
'9°
that territory will rather tend to spread the disease than to restrict it.
"
More importantly, the quarantine was made to operate exclusively against
the Chinese community, demonstrating an "evil eye and an unequal
hand." 91
Modern courts have consistently required a clear public health justification for any personal control measure. In New York State Associationfor
Retarded Children v. Carey,92 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
determined that mentally retarded children who were carriers of serum
hepatitis could not be excluded from regular public school classes.
Hepatitis B is transmitted by blood. Although the virus is found in saliva, it
is an inefficient mode of transmission. The court found that "the Board was
unable to demonstrate the health hazard . . .was anything more than a
remote possibility.19 3 This remote possibility did not justify the action
taken, considering "the detrimental effects of isolating the carrier children. ' 94 The Court was sensitive to the fact that segregation of mentally
retarded children would "reinforce the stigma to which these children have
already been subjected." 95
The trial court in District 27 Community v. The Board of Education96
proscribed discrimination against a school child with AIDS:

7

at 53, 139 N.E. at 205.
People ex rel. Baker v. Strautz, 386 111.360, 367, 54 N.E.2d 441, 444 (1944).
88 103 F. 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900).
9Id. at 22.
91 1d. at 24.
82 New York State Assoc. for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir.
Id.

88

1979).
8
Mid. at 645.
84
1d. at 650.
95Id.

98District 27 Comm. School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325
(Sup. Ct. 1986).
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[Since] the apparent nonexistent risk of transmission of HTLVIII/LAV in the school setting finds strong support in the
epidemiologic data ...

and because the automatic exclusion of

children with AIDS ... would effect a purpose having no adequate connection with public health, it would usurp the function
of the commissioner of health if this court adjudged ...

that the

non-exclusion policy was arbitrary and capricious. 91
Other contemporary public health cases have taken the same view of
the requirement of a public health necessity. Discrimination against a
teacher with tuberculosis was proscribed in Arline v. School Board of Nassau
County. 9 The Supreme Court insisted upon some plausible medical justification for the discriminatory action. 99 The danger of proceeding with
compulsory public health action in the absence of a solid scientific foundation has been frequently demonstrated in the course of contemporary
public health history. 0 It is important that state statutes clearly specify
"public health necessity as the foundation for the exercise of compulsory
powers."
2. The Avoidance of Serious Harm
To establish a public health necessity, the state should demonstrate, by
clear and convincing scientific, epidemiologic, and/or medical evidence,
that:
(1) there is urgent need to interrupt the spread of an epidemic;
(2) in a particular case, the person is shown to be infectious by a
thorough medical examination and any necessary serologic or
other tests;
(3) there is a reasonably high probability that the infection will be
communicated; and
(4) the control measure is likely to be effective in eliminating or
reducing the risk of contagion.

Public health statutes should be designed to prevent a significant
deprivation of individual rights based upon purely speculative assumptions. The justification for a public health action that fundamentally interferes with individual rights must be a currently established scientific assessment of' reasonably high probability of serious harm. Public health
powers are exercised under the theory that they are necessary to prevent
an avoidable harm. An important public health question is how serious and

9 502 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
91School Bd. v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
99
Id. at 1129.
10oSee generally A. BRANDT, supra note 73.
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probable that harm must be in order to justify deprivation of individual
rights.
In exercising a compulsory power, the state is not purporting to act in
the interest of the individual and does not require a showing that the
intervention is justified by personal incompetency, self-protection, or the
need for care or treatment. As the predominant rationale for public health
intervention is prevention of harm to the public, the seriousness and
probability of that harm should be the primary parameter for decisionmaking. The absence of any intention to serve the interests of the individual suggests that the threshold for public health action should be a
reasonably high probability of serious harm to the public.
A decision to take compulsory public health action in any individual
case should be based upon a careful balance between the degree of intrusion upon individual rights and the probability and gravity of the harm to
be avoided. As the public health measure becomes more intrusive in its
restriction of rights and longer in duration, the gravity and probability of
harm must be greater in order to justify the action. Ultimately, the right of
the state to take measures which avoid a probable and grave harm must be
respected, even at the cost of individual civil liberties. It does no service to
groups at risk for disease to fail to implement effective public health
measures in the name of protection of their liberty. The health of the
community is perhaps the most important human and societal value.
C.

CONFIDENTIALITY

A person's health status is a private matter, and contraction of a
communicable disease can be stigmatizing. Many personal reasons exist for
keeping health care information confidential. The methods usually associated with contracting the disease can be deeply intertwined with morals
and the criminal law. Sexual transmission of syphilis or gonorrhea is an
intimate matter. Certain forms of transmission of a sexually transmitted
disease, such as through anal intercourse, associates a person with
homosexuals, a group long scorned and victimized. Sodomy, moreover, is a
crime in approximately half the states, 10 ' and the Supreme Court has held
these criminal statutes constitutional. 02 Other diseases such as AIDS and
hepatitis can be contracted through intravenous needle use, associated with
drug abusers.
In addition to the method of contracting the disease, an important
o See Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect
Classification, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1285, n.4 (1985) (twenty-three states and the District of
Columbia still have criminal statutes proscribing private, consensual sodomy).
102Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (state criminal sanctions for consensual
homosexual sodomy upheld as applied).
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reason for confidentiality is the perceived chance of transmittingthe disease.
AIDS, leprosy, and tuberculosis are feared because they are sometimes
perceived as being transmittable through casual contact. People with these
and other diseases are shunned, because the community fears that their
children will be exposed to the disease in public places such as schools.
For certain noninfectious diseases such as mental illness, drug dependency, or alcoholism, there is often an attribution of blame, and a perceived
association with dangerous behavior and/or idleness. Many in the community morally disapprove of the disease status itself. Social stigmatization is a
strong reason for holding health information confidential. Even more
important is the discrimination which can result from a breach of confidence. America has read almost daily about the discrimination against persons with the AIDS virus: seclusion of children from school, and loss of
10 3
employment, housing, or insurance.
Confidentiality also has an important public health purpose. The objective of public health officials is to encourage individuals to come forward
for testing, education, counselling, medical examination, vaccination and
treatment. The basis for cooperation with public health objectives depends
upon both the trust a person has in the confidentiality of information, and
the strength of legal protection.
Confidentiality of health care information at present can be compromised in many ways. The diagnosis that a person has an infectious disease,
or carries an infectious agent, may trigger a statutory or regulatory obligation upon the physician or laboratory to report the patient's name to the
public health department. The public health department will usually keep
the person's name or other identifying characteristics on a register, and
may use the information for tracing sexual contacts.
A diagnosis of an infectious disease will also be written into the patient's medical record. That record is made available to staff throughout
the hospital, and is frequently given to third party payors outside the
hospital. This wide accessibility to the medical record increases the likelihood of negligent or intentional disclosure. A number of common law,
constitutional, and statutory confidentiality protections exist, but are sometimes insufficient.

The unauthorized disclosure of confidential information during the
course of a physician-patient relationship is a common law tort. Most courts
have imposed a legally enforceable duty of confidentiality and have
grounded their decisions upon the importance to public policy of a sphere
of privacy between doctor and patient. 10 4 The Massachusetts Supreme
103

See generally D. ALTMAN, AIDS

IN THE MIND OF AMERICA: THE SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND

PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT A NEW EPIDEMIC (1986).

'0 4 See Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801-02 (N.D. Ohio
1965); Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 298 Or. 706, 696 P.2d 527 (1985); cf. Hague v.
Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 181 A.2d 345 (1962).
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Judicial Court held that a "duty of confidentiality arises from the
physician-patient relationship and that a violation of that duty, resulting in
damages, gives rise to a cause of action sounding in tort against the physician."105
Constitutions also protect the right to privacy.1 6 The Supreme Court
has limited the right to privacy under the U.S. Constitution to certain
narrow areas surrounding procreation, family life and child rearing. 0 7 Yet,
the Court has indicated that the state must maintain strong protections of
confidentiality of information collected by the public health department. In
Whalen v. Roe, 08 although the Court upheld reporting requirements reasonably related to a valid public health purpose, it required both the
containment of the information within the public health department, and
the existence of adequate statutory protection of confidentiality.
In addition to information reported to the public health department,
federal courts have required confidentiality of research data. In Farnsworth
v. Procter & Gamble Co.,' 0 9 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit upheld the right of the Centers for Disease Control
("CDC") to protect information furnished by women research subjects in
the CDC's Toxic Shock Syndrome Studies, noting:
[T]he Center's purpose is the protection of the public's health.
Central to this purpose is the ability to conduct probing scientific
and social research supported by a population willing to submit to
in-depth questioning. Undisputed testimony in the record indicates that disclosure of the names and addresses of these research
participants could seriously damage this voluntary reporting.
Even without an express guarantee of confidentiality there is still
an expectation, not unjustified, that when highly personal and
potentially embarassing information is given for the sake of medical research, it will remain private." 0
Finally, protections of confidentiality are founded in most state public
health statutes."' The strongest confidentiality protections apply to sexually transmitted diseases, "STDs," because of the deeply rooted personal
values and moral overtones associated with venereal diseases." 2 One of the

105Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 69. 479 N.E.2d 113, 120 (1985).
106The right to privacy has been expressly protected in several state constitutions. See, e.g.,
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
'See supra notes 37, 41, 44 and accompanying text.
108429 U.S. 589 (1977).
109 758 F.2d 1545 (11 th Cir. 1985).
n0 Id. at 1547.

"'E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.231 (West 1986); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 126,
1987).
M See notes 70-72 supra and accompanying text.

21 (West Supp.
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major elements of a sound, confidentiality statute is its ability to protect
records against subpoena or judicial order. A few statutes such as those in
Illinois"t 3 and New York City1 4 have been judicially construed to ensure
that the privilege or exemption under the statute overrides the subpoena
or judicial order.
Certain diseases, such as chemical dependency and AIDS, have been
considered sufficiently stigmatizing to warrant special confidentiality protection. The federal Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Records
Regulations' 1 5 cover any program which holds itself out as providing diagnoses, treatment, or treatment referrals for alcohol or drug abuse, and
which is federally assisted, directly or indirectly.
An increasing number of state statutes also protect HIV-related information." 6 The level of protection of confidentiality varies tinder each
statute. Early statutes, such as those of California and Massachusetts,
explicitly prohibited disclosure without consent. Recent confidentiality
statutes have begun to require notification of medical personnel in an
emergency (California, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine).
Yet, existing common law, and constitutional and statutory protections
of confidentiality of public health information remain inadequate. The
duty of confidentiality under the common law is based upon the intimacy of
the doctor-patient relationship. Accordingly, disclosures of information by
the public health department may not be actionable at common law. The
constitutional right to privacy is not limited by the nature of the therapeutic
relationship, but by the Supreme Court's narrow conception of what
spheres of privacy are protected. It is unclear whether the Court would
find a constitutionally protected privacy interest in all health care information.
The major source of protection of confidentiality, therefore, is stattutory. Yet existing statutory protection is idiosyncratic and depends upon
the jurisdiction and/or the classification of the patients' infectious condition. A modern public health confidentiality statute should apply uniformly
to all disease classifications. Any public health information may become an
intensely private matter for the individual. The degree of confidentiality
protection should not depend upon a preconceived view of the stigma

"' People ex rel. Director of Public Health v. Calvo, 89 Ill. 2d 130, 137, 432 N.E.2d 223,

226 (1982).

14In re Baker's Mut. Ins. Co. of New York, 301 N.Y. 21, 25-26, 92 N.E.2d 49, 51 (1950);
McGowan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 141 Misc. Rep. 834, 182 N.E. 81 (1932).
1152 Fed. Reg. 21, 797 (1987) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. Part 2).
1 6
Gostin & Ziegler, A Review of AIDS-Related Legislative and Regulatory Policy in the United

States, 15 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 5, 13 (1987) (reviewing, among others, statutes in
California, Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts and Wisconsin). See generally
Nanula, ProtectingConfidentiality in the Effort to ControlAIDS, 24 HARV.J. ON LEGIs. 315 (1987).
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attached to a disease. Further, dissemination of information should be a
personal matter within the patient's control.
The components of a strong confidentiality statute are:
(1) a specific subpoena exemption protecting all information and
records held by the health department relating to known or suspected cases of disease;
(2) a disclosure allowance enumerating the conditions under
which a release is permissible and specifying that patient consent is
required for the release of any details; and
(3) a testimonial exemption protecting all state and local health
department officers and employees from courtroom examination,
and covering records of cases examined and/or treated by private
sector medical facilities.
Statutes also do not currently explain clearly the doctors' or public
health officials' duty to protect or warn third parties. The common law has
developed a doctrine which, in certain circumstances, requires the physician to breach confidentiality in order to protect third parties in immediate
danger of contracting a disease. The tort is based upon the special relationship between doctor and patient, and the theory that the law should
117
prevent an imminent and avoidable harm.
In the absence of legislative guidance, the physician is confronted with
a conflict of duties. Does the law require him or her to maintain confidentiality or to warn? Consider the case of a physician, who reports a case of
HIV infection or AIDS to the public health department, knowing the
patient is married. Are the physician and public health official authorized
or obliged to inform the spouse? The legal consequences can be significant,
for some statutes provide for treble damages and/or criminal penalties for
breach of HIV related information. Failure to warn, however, can result in
significant liability if the warning would have avoided transmission to the
spouse or offspring. A statute rigorously protecting confidentiality and
clearly specifying those circumstances in which the public interest overrides
the patient's confidentiality interest would benefit all parties.
In light of the weaknesses, lack of clarity, and variability between state
'
confidentiality requirements, it is important to fashion a federal statute s
117This tort theory is examined in Gostin, Curran & Clark, The Case Against Compulsory

Casefinding in ControllingAIDS: Testing, Screening and Reporting, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (1986).
"1 One suggested way of balancing confidentiality and the duty to warn is to authorize, but
not compel, a physician to warn only in cases where the physician has a reasonable belief that
there is an immediate and serious danger to an identifiable third party. The statute would
eliminate the absurd situation where good faith disclosure to prevent an avoidable harm can
result in civil or criminal penalties. It also eliminates the equally absurd scenario of a physician
being compelled by law to betray a confidence which he or she feels ethically bound to keep.
This is the balance adopted in the AIDS Federal Policy Bill of 1987, introduced by Senator
Edward Kennedy.
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or a model state statute." 9 Such a statute would strongly protect the
confidentiality of all public health information, and clarify those circumstances in which there is a need to know the information for the purposes
of effective treatment and in which disclosure is strictly necessary to protect
a third party in imminent danger. 120
D.

THE ABSENCE OF GRADED SERIES OF LESS RESTRICTIVE MEASURES

Most current public health laws provide a set of personal control
measures limited to compulsory examination, vaccination, treatment, isolation, or quarantine. They seldom have a graded series of more flexible, less
restrictive, measures. The effective options for public health officials are to
introduce either voluntary programs or severe restrictions upon personal
liberty. The temptation is either to exercise no statutory power or to reach
for provisions which are too restrictive of individual liberty to be acceptable
in a modern democratic society. In effect, public health laws provide a stick
too big to wield.
The analogy to civil commitment is useful in this context, as well.
Compulsory mental health strategies have long been limited to involuntary
hospital admission. Increasingly, care and supervision in the community
are seen as viable, less restrictive alternatives to civil commitment.
Community-based mental health programs can often accomplish the goals
of treatment and public protection as well as, or more effectively than,
institutional confinement.
When mental health joined the judicial revolution of the civil rights
movement, many courts adopted the doctrine of the least restrictive alternative."l ' Since that time, there has been increasing support for voluntary
measures or legal controls within a community setting. Guardianship and
conservatorship are two current legal mechanisms that require the mentally ill person to receive care, treatment, and some degree of control in the
community, without the necessity of full deprivation of liberty.
The principle of the least restrictive alternative can also be of great use
in the exercise of public health powers. A major goal of public health
legislation is to foster voluntary cooperation through testing, notification of
contacts, and alteration of high risk behavior. The use of a drastic involuntary measure may deter vulnerable individuals from cooperating with
public health officials or taking advantage of public health programs, such
I'D See generally National

Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,

HEALTH CARE INFORMATION ACT
20

UNIFORM

§ 2-101, 9 U.L.A. 502 (Supp. 1985).

' See Centers for Disease Control, Recommended Additional Guidelines for HIV Antibody Counseling and Testing in the Prevention of HIV Infection and AIDS (Apr. 30, 1987).
121Lake v. Cameron, 267 F. Supp. 155 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972); see text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.

THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH LAW

as clinics for the treatment of sexually transmitted diseases or drug or
alcohol abuse.
Public health officials can easily misunderstand the principle of the
least restrictive alternative. Public health is based upon the assumption that
it is preferable to provide the maximum protection against the spread of
infectious disease. It is best that any risk of error be on the side of a more
restrictive, and thus more cautious, approach. As a matter of risk management, it is understandable that if the almost certain result of contracting a
disease like AIDS is death, aggressive use of public health powers at an
early stage may be justified. The principle of the least restrictive alternative
is not necessarily inconsistent witf this view. It does not require a less
effective measure merely because that measure is less intrusive; it requires
a less intrusive measure only if it is equally or more effective than a more
restrictive procedure. The legal principle thus represents good public
policy. Vulnerable groups will appreciate the adoption of equally effective,
less restrictive alternatives and will be encouraged to comply voluntarily
with public health advice.
The doctrine of the least restrictive alternative, however, cannot resolve all dilemmas in public health policy. The nature of public health
policy is such that decisions are made under some conditions of uncertainty, and it is usually impossible to measure accurately the efficacy of two
competing public health approaches. It is, therefore, seldom a question of
choosing the least restrictive of two equally effective measures.
Nevertheless, the principle requires the decision-maker to achieve his
or her public health goals, wherever possible, with the least drastic means.
Public health statutes should make this an explicit requirement and provide
a set of less restrictive options from which the official can choose.
A comprehensive public health program should utilize a variety of less
restrictive powers, broader in scope than those currently contained in most
public health statutes. The use of less restrictive community-based powers
could allow for continued association with family, community, and work
environments; public health officials would accomplish their goals without
significant disruption of community life. By allowing infected persons to
participate in social activities, the law would encourage voluntary cooperation, while drawing clear limits by proscribing particular unsafe behaviors
or exposures.
The public health department should be empowered to issue a community health order; this would increase flexibility in fashioning a remedy
to a public health risk. This community health order might require the
person: to report all changes of address to the public health department; to
be present at appropriate places and times for the purposes of education,
counseling, testing, medical examination, or treatment; or to be admitted
on an out-patient or day-patient basis to a hospital, detoxification center, or
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clinic for treatment of drug dependency or sexually transmitted disease. A
community health order would enable public health officials to supervise
and control the infected person who poses a danger to the public, without
full deprivation of liberty.
The intention behind a community health order is not to widen the net
of persons potentially subject to control measures, but only to provide
public health officials with less intrusive, more flexible powers with which to
accomplish their objectives. Governmental powers entail restriction of
freedoms and autonomy, and can adversely affect a person's reputation.
They should be used only after complying with the same strict procedural
and substantive safeguards as previofisly discussed. Thus, the individual
should be entitled to a full and fair hearing by a court or tribunal. The
court or tribunal must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
person is infectious and likely to endanger seriously the public health. The
order should be effective for a specified duration based upon a careful
assessment of the length of time that the health risk is likely to continue.
The order should specify a maximum duration, with periods of renewal
permitted only after further review by the court or tribunal.
IV. CONCLUSION
Public health statutes for the control of communicable disease have
received less than serious examination in this century. They have developed, layer by layer, in response to new epidemics of disease. Numerous
ineffective, highly invidious measures have been attempted under the
auspices of these statutes.
Professor Curran's survey for the U.S. Secretary for Health points to
the need for major review of the objectives, criteria, powers, and procedures of public health statutes. This essay can only serve as a starting point,
mapping out the major deficiencies in current legislation. The next phase
in the process of reform should be the creation of a task force of national
caliber comprised of persons experienced in public health law, virology,
epidemiology, and other relevant disciplines to formulate guidelines and a
model statute for consideration and adoption at the state and local level.
Legal reforms in mental health during the 1970's resulted in sweeping
changes in state statutes. Reform of that magnitude is long overdue in the
public health field, and will require thoughtful and systematic consideration in the coming years. This challenge requires the leadership of Bill
Curran, to whom this symposium is dedicated.

